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Development**

USAID/Mali

**Technical Assistance to Finalize
DG SO Results Framework,
Indicators, Targets and
Activities for the SO**

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Acronyms

AIDS	Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome
AMM	<i>Association des Municipautés du Mali</i>
ANICT	<i>Agence Nationale d'Investissement Pour les Collectivités Territoriales</i>
APE	Association des Parents d'Elèves
ASACO	<i>Association de Santé Communautaire</i>
CAP	<i>Centre d'Animation Pédagogique</i>
CC	Communal Council
CDI	<i>Commissariat au Développement Institutionnel</i>
CLUSA	Cooperative League of the USA
CO	Community Organization
CS	Child Survival
CSCOME	<i>Centre de Santé Communautaire</i>
CSO	Civil Society Organization
CVA	Conflict Vulnerability Assessment
DG	Democratic Governance
ECOM	<i>Ecole Communautaire</i>
FP	Family Planning
GRM	Government of the Republic of Mali
HIV	Human Immunodeficiency Virus
IEC	Information, Education and Communication
IR	Intermediate Result
IT	Information Technologies
MATCL	<i>Ministère de l'Administration Territoriale et des Collectivités Locales</i>
MOE	Ministry of Education
MOH	Ministry of Health
NA	National Assembly
NGO	Nongovernmental Organization
NRM	Natural Resource Management
PAD	<i>Programme D'Appui à la Décentralisation</i>
PRODEC	<i>Programme Décennal de Développement de l'Education</i>
PRODESS	<i>Programme Décennal de Développement de la Santé</i>
PVO	Private Voluntary Organization
R4	Results Review & Resource Request

SC	Save the Children
SEG	Sustainable Economic Growth
SO	Strategic Objective
SpO	Special Objective
STI	Sexually Transmitted Infection
SYCOV	<i>Syndicat Cotonier et Vivrier</i>
TA	Technical Assistance
TDRL	<i>Taxe de Développement Rurale et Locale</i>
UNDP	United Nations Development Program
URTEL	<i>Union de Radio et Télévision Libre</i>
USAID	United States Agency for International Development

Shared Governance Through Decentralization

*“Decentralization and the strengthening of civil society
are fundamental to the Malian interpretation of
good democracy and good governance . . .”*

(Paulton and Youssof, in
Democratic Governance, Development and African Peacemaking”
UN, 1998; pp. 175;)

I. Development Challenge and USAID’s Advantages

Since its 1992 transition to a democratic multiparty system, Mali has made strenuous efforts to address the development challenges facing the nation, and to consolidate the gains of its nascent democratic regime. Today, the principal democratic governance problem facing Mali is the state's inability to consolidate and institutionalize a system of decentralized governance. The single most important political decision emerging from the 1991-92 revolution was the commitment to a decentralized system of governance that ensures the achievement of the dual objectives of democracy and sustainable development. Therefore, until decentralization has been institutionalized, it is not possible to consider the broader democratic system to be consolidated in Mali.

Among the factors inhibiting the consolidation and institutionalization of the decentralized system of governance are: (1) the maintenance of central administrative powers vis-à-vis all other local level actors; (2) the existence of incoherent and incomplete laws and legal codes and the problem of harmonizing them with those governing the provision of public services; (3) the lack of coordination among different government ministries and services responsible for drafting legislation, policies, and regulations; and (4) the inability of the state to effectively forge partnership with civil society and the private sector at the local level.

Faced with these challenges, the key political struggle for Mali is the consolidation of decentralizations. Among Malians, there is wide agreement that local governance structures embody decentralization, and form the only path to democracy, good governance and sustainable development. This challenge requires communes to seize the political initiative for themselves and to develop into genuinely effective and responsive institutions, capable of mobilizing resources and resolving conflicts and disputes.

Of greatest importance is commune capacity to form partnerships to promote sustained local development and prosperity. Local government alone cannot adequately accomplish this process; the partnerships of local civil society and private sector are needed. This is the notion of “shared governance” defined in the following sections.

During the last five years, USAID DG Strategic Objective for supporting the consolidation of Malian democracy has been at the level of civil society. This decision was based on the assumption that a strong civil society is an important prerequisite to any meaningful, vibrant,

democratic and decentralized local governance system. USAID current strategy has focused on institutional strengthening and advocacy capacity strengthening of community organizations, as a means of contributing to their participation in local democratic governance.

In addition to historical and comparative advantage reasons, the logic underlying the strategy was that by strengthening local organizations, Malians would have an institutional basis for participating in public life, including the making and implementation of development decisions that affected their social, economic and political well being. In fact, an important result of the old strategy and a comparative advantage for USAID under the new strategy is that a significant number of the newly elected leaders in communal councils came from civil society organizations funded under USAID support. USAID/Mali now seeks to build on the skills and values of democratic self-governance acquired by the civil society leaders by translating these skills into effective partnerships with communal councils for sustainable local development.

In preparing the new SO, the DG team reflected upon the essential elements of the current strategy, how it evolved, and how to build upon previous successes in order to make our new interventions more sustainable. In line with USAID/Mali Mission's fundamental development goal of poverty reduction, we thought it essential to build on the DG SO's involvement in supporting community organizations in sectors such as health, education, economic growth and information and communication.

Particular attention to women's representation and influence will be supported across SOs and through a set of specific activities promoting women's political engagement. USAID/Mali recognizes that Malian women are essential to Mali's economy, family welfare, and agricultural production. However, women and women's contributions and concerns remain under-represented in formal political structures and public decision-making. By addressing poverty with strategies for gender mainstreaming and community mobilization around sectoral concerns, the DG SO would be the major crosscutting element of the Strategy SOs and stimulate integration and synergy in the Mission's program.

It is important to note that the GRM's policy of transfer of competencies to the communes is the locus of local development. It is therefore logical to conclude that decentralized democratic governance should become the organizing framework for all the other strategic objectives in USAID/Mali. This GRM effort requires that all Mission strategic objectives work in synergy to achieve maximum impact.

The strategic planning process of the D/G SO Team has been conducted for more than a year. Frequent discussions with partners on successes and remaining challenges have been held, culminating in April 2001 when the team convened a meeting of an array of partners from government, civil society, donors and US PVOs to determine the most critical democratic governance challenges for Mali in the coming years. Participants included representatives from civil society and the following government institutions: Ministry of Territorial Administration and Local Collectivities (MTALC) and the Commissariat for Institutional Development (CDIR) and National Direction for Local Collectivity (DNCT).

Follow-up meetings were held to validate the problems and prioritize them as areas that the new D/G Strategic Objective could address. In addition, the D/G team met with representatives of the donor community to determine the areas in which they would be working, with an aim to achieving complementary programming. Finally, a workshop for partners was held in March 2002 to validate the performance Indicators for the new strategic framework.

A DG assessment focusing on ten-years after the transition identified institutionalizing decentralization as the principal democratic governance problem facing Mali, although other structural threats to consolidating Malian democracy were noted. For example, the formal judiciary system was found to have serious structural weaknesses, characterized by limited capacity in terms of funding and human resources and its apparent lack of transparency, leading to a severe backlog of cases. Although the Malian judiciary system is the least trusted of all national level institutions, the great majority of Malians were satisfied with the status of respect for human rights. Thus the DG assessment concluded that USAID has no comparative advantage in addressing the judiciary sector partly for a number of reasons including that other donors have significant efforts in this DG sector – e.g., the French and the Canadian Cooperatives support PRODEJ - and remaining areas for reform are beyond USAID's manageable interest.

The Assessment found the legislative branch of government has weak capacity in its ability to initiate, deliberate, craft, and pass laws. Its passivity has contributed to a lack coherence and harmony in many of the laws, often leading to a void filled by the executive branch. Even though this presents a major structural problem of consolidating democracy, USAID would address this problem indirectly through the consolidation of decentralization, by supporting the streamlining and harmonization of laws, codes and regulations at the commune, cercle, regional and national levels.

II. Purpose and Definition

The new Strategic Objective: “*A decentralized System of Shared Democratic Governance Consolidated*” is defined as a system of governance bringing all the legitimate actors – state, civil society and private sector-- together to participate as partners in local democratic governance. The hypothesis put forward by USAID/Mali is that it is the right for all legitimate actors to participate in the public realm where collective decisions are made and implemented. If decentralization is a system of governance that is expected to enhance

Opportunities for participation by placing more power and resources at the closer, local level, then all the legitimate actors and stakeholders must consciously, albeit voluntarily, participate in the process to make it effective.

The completion of communal elections in June 1999 and the gradual installation of local governance structures further reinforce this hypothesis; this offers civil society the opportunity to enter into a mutually beneficial partnership with communal councils in order to realize sustainable development. With a system of democratic local governance now in place, it is assumed that there will be greater government responsiveness and accountability on the one hand, and opportunity for broad based citizen participation in local decision making on the other. Indeed, the arrival on the local development scene of new communal councils and their

partnership with civil society completes the democratic governance equation of supply versus demand. To put it metaphorically, the continuous strengthening of only civil society is the equivalent of “one hand clapping” which most listeners would not hear. Hence, it is critical for “both hands” of the local democratic governance equation to be clapping in order to be heard. Herein lies the concept of *shared democratic governance*.

From all the discussions and consultations with our implementing partners, the one concept that emerged and, indeed, proved useful for describing the new approach to local governance, was the concept of shared governance. "Shared" concerns the right of all legitimate actors to **participate** in the public realm where collective policies and decisions are made and implemented. This concept also implies that civil society and private sector would enter into **partnerships** and take joint responsibility for service delivery in areas where it has relatively more capacity to do so than communal councils. Conversely, the concept acknowledges the possibility of tensions and conflicts as each partner seeks to articulate, defend and promote its interest and provide public goods for its constituencies. Thus, there is a need to implement proactive mechanisms to resolve conflicts emanating from shared governance functions of making and implementing decisions. This is the underlying concept of local democratic self-governance that would undergird the new DG strategy.

Poverty Reduction

This strategy is premised on the assumption that if sustainable development and poverty reduction ought to be realized in Mali, then the evolving partnership between local elected leaders, civil society and private sector should be strengthened. Through this partnership, Malians would have an institutional basis for participating in public life, including the making and implementation of decision-making that affect their social, economic and political well being. We do not make a simplistic assumption that democratic decentralization guarantees poverty reduction. There are several structural and organizational challenges facing decentralized local governance in addressing poverty reduction. Unless there are strong oversight and accountability institutions, decentralization can and often has reinforced the power of local elites and has worsened inequalities, a phenomenon that has adverse effect on poverty reduction.

First, the new strategy does not support decentralization uniformly in a manner that assumes that all legitimate local-level actors have equal capacity and political will to participate in governance processes. The strategic framework disaggregates local civil society into various sectors such as women, youth, farmers, immigrants and other marginalized groups that should be targeted for specific interventions of socioeconomic empowerment.

Second, in order to broaden the capacity and participation of all local-level actors, the strategy makes a concerted effort to promote private-public partnership (including civil society). It is in this light that the Strategic Objective makes a deliberate effort to mobilize and strengthen civil society structures, private sector and local government institutions and processes at the local level in a manner that would allow their relationship with central and sub-national units of governments to be mutually reinforcing and beneficial to local citizens. The strategy also addresses the macro-political environment in order that it would be supportive to people's welfare through, for example, fiscal decentralization as the pivotal route through which local governance can address poverty reduction.

The fact that Mali is a recipient of HIPIC funds and has already put in place a Poverty Reduction Strategic Plan (PRSP) provides opportunities for USAID DG strategy. The focus on democratic local governance supports many potential avenues for building stakeholder partnership between local councils, civil society, and private sector. Through participatory approaches, these partnerships will address poverty and provide social safety nets.

III. Results Framework

As noted, the DG Strategic Objective pledges to consolidate decentralization through fostering sustainable development partnerships between civil society, the private sector and local government. The principal measurements for this SO level result are **partnership** and **participation**. Participation is measured both in terms of percentage of men and women voting in communal elections and the rate of resource mobilization at the communal level (e.g., taxes, leveraging funds from private sources). Partnership is measured in terms of percentage of services and development delivered through participatory governance mechanisms and processes. The percentage of communes expanding their services is also viewed as an indication of good participation and partnership. Such partnerships, or shared governance, will be realized in the following manner:

- (1) USAID will promote local governance processes emphasizing participation, partnership, conflict resolution, civic culture, gender mainstreaming, transparency, and accountability.
- (2) Decentralization will be clarified and implemented as a result of agreements between key ministries, line agencies, communes, cercles, regional and central bodies.
- (3) Elements of the proposed program will be implemented nationwide, but shared governance initiatives at the community level will be targeted to specific geographic localities and will not include all communes in Mali. Progress in the North Integration Special Objective may lead to community level activities being initiated in the three northern regions of Mali in 2008.
- (4) Sustainable development will be achieved through collaboration by local government authorities, elected officials, citizens, and the private sector in raising monies, developing human resources and participatory planning for the best use of limited resources for area development.

The DG SO Indicators was chosen as they highlight the core characteristics of partnership and participation. Data for these Indicators will be consolidated from a number of IR Indicators' attributions. The SO Indicators also set the focus and parameters for USAID's manageable interest. By focus it is meant that the percents and numbers of these SO Indicators will follow baselines determined for the target communes. The target communes are those wherein there are SEG activities and potential for democratic decentralization consolidation in a 10 year time frame.

The DG Intermediate Results were chosen to highlight those understated competencies required for representative, inclusive, transparent and accountable local democratic governance. It should be noted that equity is being promoted throughout the framework. Fair dispute resolution, participatory mechanisms and women's engagement and influence are all intended outcomes of this democracy effort. By measuring changes in the key characteristics of decentralized democracy, USAID hopes to prove that sound local democratic governance supports sustainable development. No one particular characteristic out-weighs the other in this framework as all are related to consolidating best practices in an emerging system of decentralization.

The DG SO's IRs delineate three core focal areas, wherein conflict resolution and capacity strengthening bridge and crosscut all DG efforts. The GRM has successfully mediated a peaceful resolution of the Northern rebellion. USAID is ready to assist in the prevention and management of potential conflicts that might block Mali's decentralization, e.g., inter-ministerial turf and resource battles. USAID will support mechanisms for commune and cercle level conflicts related to natural resource use. These mechanisms will complement ad hoc traditional mediation practices. USAID supported civic culture activities and mediation mechanisms will help to address household conflict, wherein the rights of women are often under-supported.

Capacity strengthening is a common solution to decentralization consolidation needs. USAID's ten-year Strategy supports a realistic timeframe wherein skills transfer, the internalization of civic culture, and the repetition of revised practices, can be consolidated in Mali's decentralization. In this vein, human resources development is recognized as the key to the intended outcomes of decentralization; the objectives of sustainable development and poverty reduction.

Capturing changes under the DG SO will require the collection and documentation of people-level Indicators, e.g., commune allocation decisions that address different groups needs. The people-level nature of certain DG Indicators will then be aggregated according to sex and group type - e.g., private sector, civil society organizations, cooperatives, women's representation in commissions - for attribution to the SO. USAID is synchronizing the use of people-level Indicators to measure decentralization as is widely recommended by

Development practitioners, academics and a series of USAID guidelines, including the 1998 *Handbook of Democracy and Governance Program Indicators* and the Agency-wide reporting standard provided in the ADS 200 series.

The Indicators chosen for the DG IRs were developed through a series of technical and participatory consultations among key partners, implementing organizations, donors, and government. The final Indicators chosen were those that consensus supported in the USAID March 21st, 2002 participatory workshop for reflection and validation of the DG SO framework. The following Indicators and IRs are considered be focused, coherent, achievable, within manageable interests of USAID.

IR 1: Key communal-level actors participate in shared democratic governance

IR 1 has selected five Indicators in order to capture the range of capacities and changes USAID



will support for solid commune function. The range of these capacities and changes are detailed under each chosen Indicator. The sixth Indicator is periodic in nature as it relates to the elections.

Indicator 1.1. Number of communes with development plans and budgets responding to expressed needs of community groups.

Indicator 1.1 captures the people-level data underscoring the range of *participation* in communes. This range is noted by kinds of groups and sex/age category of persons. Solid participatory practices are assumed by certain outputs - e.g., planning documentation that underscore consultation and consideration for different groups.

Documentation for Indicator 1.1 can be found at commune centers, as such information is part of the legally mandated documentation for commune planning. Interviews with elected officials and other leaders will provide additional data as to leadership in CSOs. *Targets for Indicator 1.1 will be set once a baseline is established.*

Indicator 1.2. Number of communes that have addressed 2 or more development issues through joint action each year.

Indicator 1.3. Number of communes that work with private sector to provide at least one public good or service - e.g., schools, health centers, water points, cereal banks, communal latrines, etc.

Partnership is the focus of Indicators 1.2 and 1.3. Partnership is highlighted and data is collected in the areas of planning and follow-through, as well as resource contributions among civil society organizations (CSOs), private sector and commune officials. Commune development plans and budget documentation will be key resources for this data. Additional interviews with members of key associations and cooperatives/other private sector groups will add more insight as to how these results were accomplished. Publication of financial systems; and copies of communal financial reports and contracts will be accessible to the public. Targets for both 1.2 and 1.3 will be set once baselines are established.

Indicator 1.4. Percent of communes having participatory mechanisms to prevent and/or resolve conflicts.

As stated earlier, conflict is a key constraint and concern for decentralization and sustainable development. It is not within the manageable interests of USAID to attribute conflict outcomes. However, USAID can certainly contribute to the building of a variety of mechanisms for prevention and mediation of conflict. As these mechanisms are put into place, commune leaders will document the range of conflicts prevented and mediated, and those organizations funded to assist the related capacity strengthening efforts. Targets for 1.4 will be set once a baseline is established.

Indicator 1.5. Number or percent of citizens knowledgeable about commune proceedings, activities, and budgets/investments.

Indicator 1.6. Number of youth, women and men represented and active in the commune electoral process. (Electoral process including: campaigning, as candidates, as organized constituency groups, as boycotters, etc..) Periodic, not annual

Indicators 1.5 and 1.6 summarize the basic changes in understanding and practices, involving both civil society and local authorities, required for transparency, accountability, and inclusiveness. These three Indicators also focus on those practices related to the core reasons for having decentralization. Data collection related to capturing improvements on ***civic culture*** requires considerable but necessary efforts, as civic culture is essential to decentralization and sustainable development. The efforts will be coordinated with implementing organizations and commune leaders. Data requirements will involve interview methodologies and possibly quantitative tools such as indices.

Illustrative Activities

IR1 activities will include the strengthening of practices that incorporate citizens' and communities' inputs in commune decision-making processes, including institutionalization of transparent and accountable documentation and dissemination of information. Mechanisms for citizen's participation in local government planning and budgeting will be systematized, transparent procurement practices will be employed, and the approaches will emphasize local governance that is shared by local officials, elected leaders, and civil society. Such practices include public budget vetting structures, media dissemination of relevant information, and public access to documents. USAID/Mali will disseminate civic culture and support fora for citizens – e.g., local officials' exchanges with the objectives of collaboration, advocacy and mobilization on key issues. Centers for Civic culture and Action and other sectoral activities will assist in internalizing the knowledge needed to address individual and group concerns through local governance processes.

Elected local leaders will be assisted in forming strategic alliances with civil society and private sector institutions in order to influence local government decisions and those of central government. Alliances will be used to address resource issues such as tax revenues and control over communal resources. Public-private partnership in tax collection can also help efficiency and accountability in revenue mobilization. In addition, a systematic framework should be established for improved fiscal planning, revenue forecasting, budgeting, expenditure control, accounting and auditing. Finally, publication and application of contracting and procurement practices will contribute to better resource allocation and fewer opportunities for corruption. Alliances might also be used to promote inter-communal cooperation, linking communes to cercle, regional, and national government structures.

IR 2: Macro-political enabling environment strengthened

Although the passage of the decentralization code in 1998 and the holding of local government elections in 1999 laid the foundations for genuine decentralization and local democratic governance in Mali, the legal environment for enhancing decentralized democratic governance has not yet fully operationalized. Implementation of the decentralization code is lagging because the code did not clearly delineate the respective roles, powers, and financial resources that would be assigned to the central government, territorial administration, deconcentrated technical

services, and the different levels of local government—region, cercle, and commune.

IR2 seeks to overcome the major obstacles threatening the full implementation of decentralization by encouraging and assisting the GRM to put in place the laws, policies, and regulations needed to reduce legal, financial, and bureaucratic impediments to the efficient functioning of local government.

The DG SO Team has identified the following areas that need to be addressed at the macro-political level to strengthen the enabling environment for effective local democratic governance:

- (1) The transfer and generation of sufficient human and financial resources needed to insure that local government has the capacity to meet its new responsibilities.
- (2) The clarification and detailed description of the respective roles and responsibilities of different governmental institutions—central ministries, parastatals, territorial administration, deconcentrated technical services, local government, and traditional authorities to reduce conflicts over competencies.
- (3) The harmonization and coordination of policies and programs among the various central and local –level governmental institutions and services.

Indicator 2.1. Percent of state revenues transferred to government/communes

This Indicator captures the degree of support of central government for providing local government with financial resources to carry out its new responsibilities for providing infrastructure and public goods and services in such sectors as education, health, water, etc.

At the present time, only a tiny percentage of revenues collected by the central government are transferred to the communes. One could use the percent of state revenues transferred to local government/communes in the year the strategy begins as the base line and set targets which show a steady increase in percentage of state revenues transferred to local government.

The data to verify this Indicator is relatively easy to collect. Annual finance law lists subsidies to local government. The decentralization law determining the fiscal resources earmarks a certain percentage of various taxes collected by central government that must be returned to various local government units. One could also track new legislation increasing share of centrally collected taxes returned to communes or providing communes with new sources of revenue not cited in previous fiscal legislation.

Indicator 2.2. Percentage of taxes collected at the local level returned by the state in a timely manner

This Indicator captures the degree of efficiency of central government in returning the taxes collected at the local level and deposited in the Treasury in a timely manner. Failure to return the revenues in time disrupt local government budgetary processes and deprive local government of resources needed to pay its employees and suppliers and to execute its budget.

This Indicator is also relatively easy to track through records of tax and treasury divisions and local government accounts. Timeliness could be measured in terms of number of months in which return of taxes is delayed.

Indicator 2.3. Number of communes with sufficient personnel assigned by the central government and deconcentrated services to provide services mandated by the decentralization law

This Indicator captures the degree of effort of central government to provide sufficient human resources and local control over personnel to provide and manage the human resources needed to carry out the commune's mandated missions in such areas as education, health, sanitation, etc.

Data to verify this Indicator is relatively easy and inexpensive to collect. One can track personnel records and staffing of communal services. However, it may be difficult to define and quantify what constitutes "sufficient" personnel.

Indicator 2.4. Number of laws, policies, and regulations defining communal competencies clarified and implemented

This Indicator addresses a major source of confusion and conflict between central government institutions and different levels of local government.

Data for this Indicator is relatively easy and inexpensive to collect. One can easily track the number of laws and policies, and regulations defining communal competencies through the Journal Officiel. Tracking implementation will require interviews with communal officials to determine whether other central government institutions respect the prerogatives of the communes in certain areas—e.g., management of personnel, control over land and natural resources, choice of where to install new infrastructure, etc.

Indicator 2.5. Number of meetings held at different local government levels to harmonize and coordinate programs and policies of regional, cercle, and communal authorities

This Indicator captures the extent to which an effort is made to harmonize and coordinate policies and programs at all levels of local government to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, avoid waste and duplication in commune, cercle, and regional development plans, and to promote cooperation and synergies among the different levels of local government.

The data is relatively easy to collect and would entail looking at the minutes of various meetings held at different local government levels and those organized by the territorial administration. Data collection would be limited only to areas in which USAID/Mali is intervening.

Illustrative Activities

Activities could include technical assistance and training to the *Commissariat au Développement Institutionnel* (CDI), National Assembly Commissions dealing with decentralization, the Ministry of Territorial Collectivities, the *Haut Conseil des Collectivités Territoriales*, and the

National Association of Mayors; lobbying and advocacy activities at national level; national and regional fora to bring together representatives of the state, legislative bodies, local government, and civil society to discuss key decentralization issues; coordination of donor decentralization strategies; focus on lobbying in key sectoral areas needed to foster implementation of sectoral SOs,- e.g., health, natural resource management and land use, education, agriculture, etc..

IR 3: Women's participation in decision-making at the communal level increased

USAID DG SO and IR 1 demands attention to gender mainstreaming through disaggregated people-level Indicators and attributions in participation and resource allocation. However, USAID also recognizes that gender-mainstreaming will be better supported with a specific IR, as in IR 3.

The IR3 Indicators focus on women's representation and influence. Attention to the results of women's influence ensures their representation is not token in nature. In addition, USAID recognizes that the engagement of most Malian women in decentralization is inhibited by their time-consuming and priority responsibilities to livelihoods and family. Therefore, the kinds of influence women gain are linked to removing these particular barriers.

In addition, USAID will support the 1999 GRM *Charte pour la Promotion des Femmes Rural* (in Decentralization), wherein all key ministries have agreed on the following minimum targets: women are to be represented at 25 percent in decision-making, benefit from/receive at least 25 percent of the resources allocated at the local level, and not provide more than 25 percent of any in-kind labor contribution for public goods and services at the local level (paid labor is not limited).

Indicator 3.1. Numbers of women holding and retaining offices in communal structures and CSOs

Indicator 3.2. Number of commune decisions addressing women's status. (e.g., health, economics, education)

Indicator 3.3. Number of commune activities implemented that decreasing women's labor/and or increase their income

Data collection for these IR 3 Indicators should be part of the IR 1 efforts and methodologies, as the same documents will be reviewed, the same persons interviewed and the same organizations used to undertake the collection and analysis.

Illustrative Activities

Activities to support women's leadership, representation and influence in communal governance will include training local authorities and elected officials on how to reach and work with women, encouraging the GRM to seek and place woman in local government structures, reinforcement of women's groups through civic culture, setting of and adherence to women-targets across all USAID supported training activities in all sectors, promoting leadership skills for women mayors and councilors, civil society leaders, and creating linkages between women

leaders at the local level and national level. USAID/Mali sectoral activities will support women's labor reduction and income increase. Stories regarding successful women will be integrated into rural radio programming and other news sources. Sectors using theater and song will highlight women as decision-makers and leaders.

IV. Contextual Assumptions

Although Mali has made great strides towards democratization under the Third Republic in several major areas—e.g., human rights, freedom of speech and media, stabilization of the democratic process, and the installation of elected local government councils—several critical risks and vulnerabilities remain. These could adversely affect efforts to fully implement decentralization reforms and the consolidation of shared democratic governance.

As noted in the USAID/Mali 2001 Conflict Vulnerability Assessment (CVA), regional instability could spill over into Mali and undermine decentralization and other governance efforts. The CVA also notes Mali's leadership has spearheaded conflict mediation in the region. In addition, although peace has settled in the Northern part of Mali, the potential for armed violent conflict still exists. This potential remains fueled by a number of factors including environmental degradation, resource scarcity, and mistrust between ethnic groups.

Some of the most important risks to be considered at the national level include the lack of political will to devolve power and resources to local government, confusion over the respective roles and responsibilities of central and local government, the limited financial resources of the state, and a decline in public confidence in national-level institutions due to corruption and squabbling among the main political parties.

At the subnational level, major risks and vulnerabilities include traditional modes of governance which tend to exclude women, youth, and minorities from full participation in community decision-making, limited financial capacity and human resources at the commune level, and the special problems posed by the Northern regions' underdevelopment and lack of integration into the national system.

V. Linkages

a. Linkages within DG SO: Decentralized System of Shared Democratic Governance Consolidated

All three IRs are closely related. Strengthening the Macro-Political Enabling Environment (IR 2) contributes to the timely transfer of necessary financial and human resources to local government and the clarification of the respective roles of central government and local government institutions. It gives local government the tools needed to function effectively. Without the results implied in IR 2, a decentralized system of democratic governance is unlikely to become consolidated.

While IR 2 establishes a solid foundation and rules for decentralization, IR 1 insures that the results sought in the DG SO are realized at the local level by promoting participation and

partnership of all local actors in local governance. Successful results in IR 1 will lead to the mobilization of greater financial and human resources for development purposes, insure the active participation of local actors in communal decision-making, and foster collaboration between local government, civil society, and the private sector to produce public goods and services together. It also highlights the fact that government alone is not responsible for development, but that development is best served by bringing together and involving all members of society in a joint effort to improve living standards and the quality of life. IR 2 thus contributes to the consolidation of shared democratic governance.

IR 3, which focuses on increasing women's participation in decision-making at the communal level, focuses on a major aspect of IR 1. The increased participation of women in decision-making contributes to democratic governance by empowering one of the most marginalized groups in Malian society who constitute more than half of the population.

b. Linkages within the Mission Strategy

As previously stated, decentralized democratic governance should become the organizing framework for all the other strategic objectives in USAID/Mali. The DG SO has strong linkages and synergies with the three major sectoral SOs in health, education, and accelerated economic growth, especially in the areas of building capacity—e.g., leadership, planning, financial management, etc.-, providing local public services, and in fostering income generation and mobilization of resources.

All three sectoral SOs strive to strengthen democratic governance practices - e.g., transparency, accountability - within CSOs and private sector groups with whom they are working—village associations, cooperatives, APEs, ASACOs, women's groups, etc--to increase the local population's partnership with local government and deconcentrated sectoral services. Synergies between DG and the other SOs can be fostered by civic culture campaigns that address sectoral issues as well as the citizen's understanding of his/her political rights and obligations. Clarification of decentralization and deconcentration policies rules, and regulations and the transfer of human and financial resources to the local level promoted by the DG SO also contribute to the achieving of results in the sectoral SOs.

The DG SO also has strong linkages with the Info-Communications SO designed to make information accessible and useful through innovative and appropriate tools such as radio and Internet. The DG SO works with the Info-Communications SO to disseminate information and messages concerning civic culture and local government activities and a platform for discussing public issues. The dissemination and assimilation of good information is also critical to improving the capacity of local communities to understand how government works.

c. Conformance with Donor and GRM Programs

The GRM has demonstrated a strong commitment to decentralization. The DG SO seeks to contribute to strengthening the elaboration and implementation of the government's decentralization policies. Both the DG and sectoral SOs are working within the framework of Mali's long-term policies to promote democracy and alleviate poverty.

The DG SO also has linkages and synergies with other donor efforts in DG areas. The European Union is strengthening the capacity of national institutions like the CDI and the MATCL to formulate and move forward in drafting and implementing policies, laws, and regulations related to decentralization. A number of other donors are supporting activities to strengthen commune capacities for local area development and decentralization. The Swiss, the French, GTZ, and UNDP and UNCDF are all engaged in activities that reinforce the elected officials ability to respond to their constituents with public goods and services. Some donors are providing temporary Local Development Funds at the commune level in order to spur application of financial and planning skills training. Others are working at the CCC level.

DG efforts by other donors tend to stress training of local government officials or strengthening or local government institutions, CSOs, and the macro-political and legal enabling environment. USAID's comparative advantage and innovation regarding decentralization is its emphasis on promoting partnership and synergies between local government, civil society, and the private sector in efforts to alleviate poverty.

VI. Instruments

USAID/Mali will be best served by a variety of instruments to implement its range of democratic decentralization activities.

Representative leadership at the local level, the promotion of women into elected positions, and constituency representation and advocacy from commune leaders to higher bodies of government might make use of those organizations that specialize in political leadership, constituency building and the electoral process. Such organizations should be non-partisan in nature and could be engaged through a cooperative agreement or grant basis. Such groups might also assist in conflict resolution as it relates to elections.

Cooperative agreements or grants might be applied to underscore USAID focal areas in conflict resolution, civic culture and training for commune competencies. Organizations have the comparative advantage of the on-going grass-roots presence needed for commune capacity strengthening should be prioritized. However, selection criteria for these organizations might need to be revisited; e.g., criteria might include a cost-benefit ratio analysis as part of the selection process.

Grants and/or subgrants to selected Malian PVOs/NGOs could be periodically employed for counterpart strengthening of commune leaders and authorities and other key Malian NGOs/PVOs in gender mainstreaming. The mechanisms for bringing in educated Malian women are plentiful. National PVOs/NGOs could be selected that have capacity to link subsistence women's concerns and contributions to policy makers. Gender sensitivity training could also be applied to national capacity strengthening programs for policy development. In addition, task specific contracts could be used to hire national gender experts to review GRM policies for attention to women's economic and social needs. Sub-grants should probably be managed through organizations that can assess PVO capacities and provide guidance on reporting requirements to USAID.

Timely and episodic technical assistance might also be provided to the commune strengthening and functioning focus through contracted task orders that provide key recommendations and products. For example, contracted TA might be used to make final determination of conflict areas for commune mediation, finalize guidelines that build upon the best capacity strengthening practices of key implementing PVOs/NGOs for distribution to the GRM and donors.

Linkages between SOs could be also be strengthened through contracted TA. Such linkages would integrate best practices related to the economic base needed for sustained political engagement and the integrating of civic culture and rights and laws as they relate to issues of a sectoral nature.

Non project assistance (NPA), in the form of short-term technical advisors, could be periodically recruited to assist the GRM in the institutional analysis and finalization of functions, responsibilities, budgets, and fiscal transfers. These advisors could also provide to USAID/Mali a list of suggested reforms, track those changes that are implemented and analyze the bottlenecks, and supply corrective strategies for stunted areas.

NPA could also be used in hosting a inter-donor committee for decentralization. In this case, NPA funds might be applied to results-oriented workshops with donors and the GRM. Such workshops could facilitate the determination of decentralization time frames, action plans, and resources for key reforms in key sectors. The GRM would in turn be able to request coordinated inputs that fall within the donors' mandates. It should be noted that all donors working in decentralization have stated that the failure to transfer resources and personnel to the commune is the greatest obstacle to the implementation of decentralization. USAID/Mali might be able to generate significant progress should there be a donor and GRM adoption of partnership concept and partnership resources for local governance.

USAID/Mali Results Framework for DG SO

A decentralized system of shared democratic governance consolidated

Overall Indicators:

Ind 1: % of communes in which partnerships increase delivery of public services.

Ind 2: Number of men/women participating in commune level elections.

Ind 3: % of communes expanding public goods and services within their authority.

Development Context:

- Stabilization of democratic process
- Respect for human rights
- Freedom of speech & expansion of independent media

Critical Risks/Vulnerabilities:

- Political will to devolve both power and resources (IR 2 & IR1)
- Confusion over roles and responsibilities increasing likelihood of conflict (IR 2)
- Current monopoly of local government offices by ruling party
- Inequity in the distribution of benefits
- Capacity (human and financial) at the commune level (IR 1)
- Exclusion based on gender, age and ethnicity (IR 1)
- Perception of under development/representation in north
- Traditional vs modern governance (IR 2)
- Excessive corruption (IR 1)

Intermediate Result 1

Key communal level actors participate in shared democratic governance

Indicators:

- Ind 1.1: Number of communes with development plans and budgets responding to expressed needs of community groups.
- Ind 1.2: Number of communes that have addressed 2 or more development issues through joint action each year.
- Ind 1.3: Number of communes that work with private sector to provide at least one public good or service.
- Ind 1.4: Percent of communes having participatory mechanisms to prevent and/or resolve conflicts.
- Ind 1.5: Number or percent of citizens knowledgeable about commune proceedings, activities, and budgets/investments.

Ind 1.6: Number of youth, women and men represented and active in the commune electoral process. Not annual, periodic

Intermediate Result 2

Macro-Political Enabling Environment Strengthened

Indicators:

- Ind 2.1: % of state revenues transferred to local government/communes.
- Ind 2.2: % of taxes collected at the local level returned by the state in a timely manner.
- Ind 2.3: Number of communes with sufficient personnel assigned by the central government and deconcentrated services to provide services mandated by the decentralization law.
- Ind 2.4: Number of laws, policies, and regulations defining communal competencies clarified and implemented.
- Ind 2.5: Number of meetings held at different levels to harmonize and coordinate programs and policies of regional, cercle, and communal authorities.

Intermediate Result 3

Women's participation in decision making at the commune level increased

Indicators:

- Ind 3.1: Numbers of women holding and retaining offices in communal structures and village associations.
- Ind 3.2: Number of times commune leaders meet with women's group.
- Ind 3.3: Number of commune activities implemented that decreasing women's labor/and or increase their income.

A key result necessary for the achievement of this IR is Women's economic empowerment - other donors and the SEG will accomplish this IR.

Illustrative Activity Types

IR 1

- Training in planning, financial management, conflict resolution, decision making, understanding specific rights and responsibilities, transparency performance monitoring
- Documentation and sharing of best practices through exchange visits, pilot activities
- Activities to strengthen the Association of Malian municipalities

Continuation of IR 1 activities

- Use of rural radio for civic education
- Linkages to nat. level for advocacy.
- Facilitating platforms for consultation
- Financial resource mobilization which could include Community foundations, municipal bonds, city to city programs, GDA, donor funding
- TA to develop fundable proposals/investment plans

IR 2

- Training
- TA related to drafting regulations and creating modalities for implementation
- Facilitation of discussion between institutions
- Development and sharing of best practices through pilot activities and exchanges
- TA/training to clarify roles and responsibilities

IR 3

- Advocacy/leadership training
- Women as candidates training
- Women's role models in theater, song and rural radio
- Grassroots to policy links with women professionals and women in subsistence communities



Illustrative Intermediate Results Table

The following USAID/Mali DG SO IR tables are illustrative in nature. These tables are offered as tools to be completed and finalized once certain decisions are taken by USAID Mali. Such decisions include (1) determining the final numbers of communes to be included in the 10-year strategy; and (2) the targeted communes for gender mainstreaming and other key activities e.g., civic culture centers. In addition to narrowing the numbers of communes, baseline data is required developing feasible percentage and number increases for various indicators.

USAID/Mali DG SO IR 1: Key communal-level actors participate in shared democratic governance.

IR 1 has selected five Indicators in order to capture the range of capacities and changes USAID will support for solid commune function. The sixth Indicator is periodic in nature as it relates to the elections.

INDICATOR	DESCRIPTION	DATA SOURCE	METHODOLOGY	ANNUAL TARGETS: Illustrative
Indicator 1.1. Number of communes with development plans and budgets responding to expressed needs of community groups.	Indicator 1.1 captures the people-level data underscoring the range of participation in communes. This range is noted by kinds of groups and sex/age category of persons. Solid participatory practices are assumed by certain outputs - e.g., planning documentation that underscore consultation and consideration for different groups.	Documentation to be found at commune centers, as such information is part of the legally mandated documentation for commune planning.	Review of area plans and budgets and interviews with elected officials and other leaders to provide additional data re CSO leadership.	Annual increase of - five communes first 5 years, 10 communes 2nd 5 years - wherein plans that document representative and inclusive consultation. Annual increase of - five communes first 5 years, 10 communes 2nd 5 years - in those plans wherein budget allocations increasingly respond to marginalized groups' priorities.
Indicator 1.2 . Number of communes that have addressed 2 or more development issues through joint action each year.	Partnership is the focus of Indicators 1.2 and 1.3. Partnership is highlighted and data is collected in the areas of planning and follow-through, as well as resource contributions among CSOs, private sector and commune officials.	Commune development plans and budget documentation will be key resources for this data.	Additional interviews with members of key associations and cooperatives/other private sector groups will add more insight as to how these results were accomplished.	Annual increase of - five communes first 5 years, 10 communes 2nd 5 years -wherein partners share/act on 2 or more local development issues.
Number of communes that Indicator 1.3 Number of communes that works with private sector to provide at least one public good or service - e.g., schools, health centers, water points, etc.	<i>ditto</i>	<i>ditto</i>	<i>ditto</i>	Annual increase of - five communes first 5 years, 10 communes 2nd 5 years - wherein partners share costs of public goods and/or services.

INDICATOR	DESCRIPTION	DATA SOURCE	METHODOLOGY	ANNUAL TARGETS: Illustrative
Indicator 1.4. Percent of communes having participatory mechanisms to prevent and/or resolve conflicts.	USAID will contribute to the building of a variety of mechanisms for prevention and mediation of conflict.	Commune leaders to document the range of conflicts prevented and mediated. Instruments/ partners to document related capacity strengthening efforts.	Additional interviews with representatives of different societal groups (youth, women, cooperatives) will add more insight as to how these results were accomplished.	Annual increase of five percent- wherein communes gain additional and/or strengthened mediation and conflict resolution mechanisms.
Indicator 1.5. Number of citizens knowledgeable about commune proceedings, activities, and budgets/investments.	Indicators 1.5 and 1.6 summarize the basic changes in understanding and practices, involving both civil society and local authorities, required for transparency, accountability, and inclusiveness.	Data collection efforts will be coordinated with implementing organizations and commune leaders - an index will be developed for capturing improvements on civic culture.	Data requirements will involve interview methodologies and possibly quantitative tools such as indices.	Annual increase of - five communes first 5 years, 10 communes 2nd 5 years - wherein citizens are knowledgeable of local politics.
Indicator 1.6. Number of youth, women and men represented and active in the commune electoral process. <i>Periodic, not annual</i>	<i>ditto</i>	Data collection efforts will be coordinated with implementing organizations and commune leaders. Commune legally required to document electoral activities, however, this information might only be found at cercle level.	Data will be designated according to tracking categories. Interviews with key groups will assist in documenting the reasons for increasing and decreasing electoral participation. <i>Episodic and to be determined.</i>	<i>Episodic and to be determined.</i>

USAID/Mali DG SO IR 2: Macro-political enabling environment strengthened.

INDICATOR	DESCRIPTION	DATA SOURCE	METHODOLOGY	ANNUAL TARGET: Illustrative
Indicator 2.1. Percent of state revenues transferred to government/ communes.	Central government's political will for providing local government with financial resources to carry out its new responsibilities in public goods and services is tracked by Indicator 2.1.	Central laws and budgets, and communes budgets/resources and service provision.	Review and comparison of annual finance law listing subsidies to local government, decentralization law determining fiscal resources earmarks, percentage of various taxes collected by central government returned to various local government units.	Five percent annual increase of state revenues designated for transfer to local government/communes.
Indicator 2.2. Percentage of taxes collected at the local level returned by the state in a timely manner.	The degree of efficiency of central government in returning the taxes collected at the local level and deposited in the Treasury in a timely manner.	Records of tax and treasury divisions and local government accounts.	Track distribution through records of tax and treasury divisions and local government accounts. Timeliness could be measured against the number of months in which return of taxes is delayed.	5 percent annual increase regarding timeliness of tax return to local government/communes.

INDICATOR	DESCRIPTION	DATA SOURCE	METHODOLOGY	ANNUAL TARGET: Illustrative
Indicator 2.3. Number of communes with sufficient personnel assigned by the central government and deconcentrated services to provide services mandated by the decentralization law.	Effort of central government to provide sufficient human resources and local control over personnel to provide and manage the human resources needed to carry out the commune's mandated missions.	Personnel and staffing of communal services records.	Review personnel records and, through interviews with commune officials, determine what constitutes "sufficient" personnel. Thereafter, track changes in these personnel allocations. This "sufficiency" can be measured sector by sector.	Increase of five communes per year (1 st 5 years) then 10 communes per year (2 nd 5 years) wherein personnel are delivered. This "sufficiency" can be measured sector by sector
Indicator 2.4. Number of laws, policies, and regulations defining communal competencies clarified and implemented.	This Indicator addresses a major source of confusion and conflict between central government institutions and different levels of local government.	Laws, policies, and regulations defining communal competencies through the Journal Officiel.	Tracking implementation will require interviews with communal officials to determine whether other central government institutions respect the prerogatives of the communes in certain areas--- e.g., management of personnel, control over land and natural resources, choice of where to install new infrastructure, etc.	Numbers of laws and policies, and regulations defining communal competencies through the Journal Officiel - and- numbers of those laws, policies, regs implemented with a target of 5 percent increase per annum.
Indicator 2.5. Number of meetings held at different local government levels to harmonize and coordinate programs and policies of regional, cercle, and communal authorities.	This Indicator captures the extent to which an effort is made to harmonize and coordinate policies and programs at all levels of local government to prevent, manage and resolve conflicts, avoid waste and duplication in commune, cercle, and regional development plans, and to promote cooperation and synergies among the different levels of local government.	Minutes of various meetings held at different local government levels and those organized by the territorial administration.	The data is relatively easy to collect and would entail looking at the minutes of various meetings held at different local government levels and those organized by the territorial administration. Data collection would be limited only to areas in which USAID/Mali is intervening. Interviews with key officials might enhance this data collection.	These numbers should be counted by commune: Numbers of communes wherein this practice becomes standard to increase by 5 per year, <i>and in these communes</i> , Numbers of such meetings to increase to three to five (total) per year between all the various levels of government .

USAID/Mali DGSO IR 3: Women's participation in decision-making at the communal level increased.

The IR3 Indicators focus on women's representation and influence. Attention to the results of women's influence ensures their representation is not token in nature. In addition, USAID recognizes that the engagement of most Malian women in decentralization is inhibited by their time-consuming and priority responsibilities to livelihoods and family. Therefore, the kinds of influence women gain are linked to removing these particular barriers.

In addition, USAID will support the 1999 GRM *Charte pour la Promotion des Femmes Rural* (in Decentralization), wherein all key ministries have agreed on the following minimum targets: women are to be represented at 25 percent in decision making, benefit from/receive at least 25 percent of the resources allocated at the local level, and not provide more than 25 percent of any in-kind labor contribution for public goods and services at the local level (paid labor is not limited).

INDICATOR	DESCRIPTION	DATA SOURCE	METHODOLOGY	ANNUAL TARGET: Illustrative and based upon minimal baseline data
Indicator 3.1. Numbers of women holding and retaining offices in communal structures and CSOs.	In terms of influence, and tracking incremental changes, women's representation is important in both CSOs and local government structures.	Data collection for these IR 3 Indicators should be part of the IR 1 efforts and methodologies, as the same documents will be reviewed, the same persons interviewed and the same organizations used to undertake the collection and analysis.	See DATA SOURCES	Increase of two to five women leaders per year per commune. At least two women per "succeeding" political party elected post (episodic) per commune. *
Indicator 3.2. Number of commune decisions addressing women's status. (E.g., health, economics, education.)	This Indicator proves that women have increasing influence on how resources are designated.	<i>ditto</i>	<i>ditto</i>	Number s of communes wherein this occurs to increase by 5 each year - at least two commune decisions per year to address women's status.
Indicator 3.3. Number of commune activities implemented that decrease women's labor/and or increase their income.	One of the core objectives for increasing women's influence is to reduce their burdens. It is anticipated that women's increasing influence will result in improving their status/quality of life.	<i>ditto</i>	<i>ditto</i>	Number s of communes wherein this occurs to increase by 5 each year - at least two commune activities per year to reduce women's labor o r increase their incomes.

* By "succeeding" it is understood that not all the political parties in Mali will be able to attain elected posts. However, of those that do gain posts, perhaps USAID/Mali can promote the idea of minimal targets for women holding offices through all parties.

Annex 1. The Case for Decentralized Civic Culture Centers in Mali

1. Introduction

The existence of local government institutions is a relatively new phenomenon in Mali, especially in the rural areas. During the 1999 local government elections, Mali's rural populations had their first opportunity to participate in choosing their local government officials at the commune level.

An informed and vigilant citizenry, aware of their basic civic rights, obligations and local government functions, is key to consolidating grassroots democracy and local governance. Pilot projects like the USAID-sponsored Save the Children civic culture center operating in Bougouni commune have demonstrated the enthusiasm of local populations for learning more about democratic practices and the functioning of local government.

Because political democracy and local government institutions are so new in Mali, people have had little experience in participating in democratic institutions and are often not aware of their political and civil rights and obligations. Greater knowledge of the political rules of the game, how national and local government services ought to function, and the importance of participating in civic affairs will help Malians to become better citizens. Locally based civic culture centers can play a vital role in disseminating information and providing a forum for effective popular participation in decentralized decision-making, e.g., the community discussion of public issues.

2. Scope of Activities Civic Culture Centers

Civic cultural centers should not limit their activities exclusively to disseminating information about the Constitution, the organization of national and local government institutions, and the rights and obligations of citizens. The centers should also be geared to increase the people's understanding of governance issues in all sectors concretely affecting the people's lives—e.g., health, education, agriculture, environment, property and family rights, etc. Finally, civic culture centers should be instruments for promoting partnerships between local government officials, state technical agents, CSOs, and the private sector. The centers can provide a civil and public domain for mobilizing local human, material, and financial resources to produce public goods and services needed by the local populations. Civic culture centers could serve as multi-purpose institutions that fulfill the following roles:

- ⇒ **Training centers** for women, youth, adults, and diverse community groups in democratic governance, the functioning of local government institutions and services; better management of community-based organizations like APEs, ASAKOs, women's groups, and private sector organizations; functional literacy and numeracy to individuals and groups in the surrounding communities; and advocacy techniques.
- ⇒ **Information and documentation centers** serving as repositories of laws and regulations concerning decentralization, elections, organization of political parties, cooperatives, NGOs, and associations; local government budgets and financial records; and materials supporting participation and knowledge in activities related to health, education, environment, micro-credit, etc.
- ⇒ **Fora** for discussing public issues that bring together local government officials, technical agents in the deconcentrated state services, and representatives of CSOs, the private sector, the media and the community. Topics for discussion could include some of the following:

Women's Rights

- Local Taxation
- Property Rights
- Environmental Concerns
- Health Themes
- Improving Schools
- Campaigns for Girls to Attend Schools
- Fighting Corruption
- Conflict Prevention, Management and Resolution

3. Location and Orientation of Civic Culture Centers

The contours and orientation of activities of civic culture centers would vary according to location, available resources, and nature of populations served. One could conceive of three different models:

⇒ **Urban civic culture centers concentrated in Bamako and regional capitals.**

These would be larger and more sophisticated in operations and would be used to bring together local officials, professionals, private sector entrepreneurs, representatives of CSOs to discuss public policy affecting the capital or the regions. These centers would contain a documentation center, serve as training centers for various civic culture programs and election monitoring activities as well as facilitate coordination of regional and cercle-level planning. They could serve as the main instrument for disseminating national-level information downward to the regions, circles, and communes. They could also contain Internet facilities to tap into national and international information networks and work closely with regional-level media to transmit good information.

⇒ **Peri-urban civic centers located in rural towns.**

These would be smaller and less sophisticated and operate at the urban commune or chef-lieu of the cercle. Their capacity to disseminate information would be far more limited than regional and national capital centers. They could serve as a meeting place for commune level discussion of urban issues—garbage disposal, sanitation issues, electrification, etc.

⇒ **Rural civic culture centers.**

These will be low –cost facilities and disseminate information primarily in the local languages because of low literacy rates in rural areas. These civic culture centers should also work closely with local rural radio to disseminate civic culture messages as well as those relating to health, education, environment, agriculture and other productive sectors. These centers could also serve as literacy training centers. Seasonal factors and long distances may make regular meetings and participation more difficult during the rainy and agricultural seasons.

4. Financing Civic Centers

Several operating principles if applied should keep the costs of establishing and maintaining civic cultures centers manageable:

- ◆ If possible, existing facilities—e.g., maison des jeunes, mairie, or other physical structures should be used to house civic culture center. Where no such structures exist, community might contribute labor and materials to build such a structure.
- ◆ Communities should be asked to contribute at least 10-25% of operating costs.
- ◆ Coordination between the commune, the state, deconcentrated technical services, and donors could reduce need for new investments. For example, materials in national languages produced by the

government services, NGOs, or donors for other areas could also be used in civic culture centers. Technical agents from state might also come and give talks explaining various aspects of government policies and sectoral rules and regulations instead of recruiting special personnel for these tasks.

- ◆ Commune could also allocate some funds from communal budget.
- ◆ Various community-based groups have been known to make annual contributions to support local rural radio. A similar levy might be made to support civic culture centers by cotton producers' groups, private entrepreneurs, *ressortissant groups*, APEs, etc.
- ◆ USAID and other donors would make contributions to support civic culture centers. The amount would depend on the size and scope of activities and the capacity of local institutions and groups to contribute.

5. Use of Information and Communication Technologies

Internet can be best used in the larger urban areas and perhaps in selected peri-urban areas. Civic culture centers housing computers and Internet facilities could charge a small fee to users to help pay for costs of maintaining Internet. In general, the costs of maintaining Internet facilities are high because of large phone bills. Program would have to be heavily subsidized outside of the capital. Even within the capital, Internet facilities would need some subsidies. In rural areas, Internet is more problematic for several reasons:

- ◆ Absence and/or relatively high cost of electricity.
- ◆ Lack of Internet information in local languages and low levels of literacy in French and in national languages.
- ◆ Absence of telephone lines to plug into and high telephone rates.
- ◆ High costs of maintaining the system in relation to size and income of communities.

Radio and TV. These are important media for disseminating civic culture messages and providing a broad fora for discussion of public issues. TV is likely to be more effective in large urban centers, which have electricity and higher cash incomes to purchase TV sets. Rural radio has proven to be a very effective media. Low-cost technologies have made radio available even in poor areas.

Newspapers and Journals. Mali's low literacy rates and the relatively high costs of newspapers mean that only a small percentage of the population, located primarily in the capital use and can afford to buy newspapers. Newspapers are rarely found outside the national and regional capitals.

Traditional Theatre and Entertainment Channels. These have proven to be effective media for channeling messages to the people, especially in rural areas. More use of this form of communication should be used in civic culture centers.

6. Selection Criteria for Locating Civic Culture Centers

Give preference to villages and urban communes with the following characteristics:

- ◆ Populations have already shown initiative in financing and supporting development activities on own.
- ◆ Populations have demonstrated a willingness to contribute money, labor, and materials to civic culture center.
- ◆ Communal government is willing to make a commitment to provide financial support to civic culture center.
- ◆ The presence of development champions backing the idea and working hard to make it a reality.
- ◆ The degree of access of other villages to civic culture center village.

- ◆ The presence of dynamic women's groups and other community organizations.
- ◆ The support of local administrative officials like the préfet and délégué.

7. Other Potential Areas to Support the Promotion of Civic Culture by USAID/Mali

Decentralization is the organizing framework for USAID/Mali's 10 year Strategic framework. This timeframe provides many other opportunities for promoting civic culture. These opportunities promote both civic culture as well as synergies between the SOs.

Civic culture can be augmented at both the national and grass-roots level should USAID/Mali choose to adopt the following suggested technical considerations. Support for DG/multi-sectoral synergies and civic culture are best realized in the implementation practices. In addition to the civic culture centers, USAID/Mali can also support the following activities to promote civic culture:

- ◆ . Media—radio/TV to disseminate programs in this area.
- ◆ . Theatre troupes—to disseminate messages.
- ◆ . National fora to discuss public issues such as women's rights, corruption in government, land reform, etc.
- ◆ . National campaigns in various areas —e.g., participation in elections; fight violence against women and trafficking in women and children; AIDS education campaigns; send your daughter to school campaigns, etc.
- ◆ . Better coordination with other donors.
- ◆ . Exchange of experiences between different communes.

The following specific technical recommendations will assist USAID/Mali in promoting civic culture across its Strategy:

1. USAID/Mali is poised for a more concentrated effort in civic culture and human rights education. It is suggested that USAID make good use of its grassroots outreach and national NGO partners by "piggy-backing" human rights and civic education into the community-level mobilizing activities across the SOs. Furthermore, focusing human rights and civic education on concrete examples that resonate directly in peoples' lives will have a much greater chance of being understood and applied than a more formal pedagogic approach outlining broad legal frameworks and/or charters describing these rights and responsibilities. For example, the APEs membership would benefit from knowing the GRM has signed an international convention stating its commitment to the rights for all children to education and health care.
2. Improving participation by poor people across all the SO community-level activities would be much enhanced if economic incentives were built into all mobilizing frameworks. The emphasis on the generation [of] more resources and employing them effectively: remains a necessary and core aspect of supporting community-level DG; provides an economic base for future political empowerment; and promotes the self-sufficiency of communities to initiate and respond to their own needs. The use of the Grameen Bank model for multi-sectoral development and grass-roots democracy could be employed across all SOs. This model has already been successfully adapted to many different cultural contexts and is extremely cost-effective. The Grameen Bank model allows its participants to address poverty through income-generating activities and group savings-and-loans, and training and support for internal DG practices, particularly those related to representation, decision-making, gender equity, transparency and accountability.

The model reinforces attention to the myriad conditions that create poverty and supports grass-roots problem-solving skills. For example, members of the Grameen Bank groups adopt a core set of behavioral practices in order to address: health and hygiene; the education of children, particularly girls; the promotion of natural resource management, particularly sources of water and trees; and, among its membership, the abolishment of key cultural practices that plunge families into economic straits and/or discriminate against females. In addition, many of these organized groups move on to mobilizing for political representation. Variations of the Grameen model could be rather easily integrated across all the SO CSO efforts and multiply impacts related to the CSP Program Goal.

3. USAID/Mali could support a more systematic application of quality participation and DG practices across the SO CSO efforts by ensuring that technical expertise related to these key themes is provided and shared among its partners. At the institutional level, members of the USAID/Mali DG team could participate in key reviews and/or identify a core group of experts to be part of the review and guidance efforts. This coordination would better ensure that the CSOs have the best possible opportunities for reaching goals related to representation, advocacy, influencing the GRM, and revenue raising and allocation.
4. USAID/Mali has many opportunities to create occasions whereby grassroots representatives can directly dialogue with high-level GRM officials, policy makers, and other donors. The establishment of a practice of annual meetings wherein selected grassroots representatives can present their concerns and solutions directly to national policy makers would put a human face on policy reform or implementation effort.

For example, the four USAID-funded US PVOs hold regular meetings with the GRM, USAID/Mali and its national NGO counterparts. The national NGO counterparts in turn meet with the population involved in their USAID/US PVO financed activities. These consultation practices could better support advocacy, representation and good dialogue by holding an annual event wherein selected grassroots representatives from the NGOs activity areas meet directly with US PVOs, USAID, the GRM, and national NGOs counterparts to discuss how their lives are changing as a result of these activities and new practices.

5. The spread of HIV AIDS is caused by many underlying economic and socio-cultural conditions. USAID/Mali's efforts for addressing the spread of AIDS would be best served through a multi-sectoral approach. In the area of DG, women's economic status and rights, and the rights of the HIV-positive person could be integrated into this approach. However, the issues of women's rights and the rights of the HIV-positive person are entangled with a variety of cultural norms and beliefs. For example, in the cultural context of Mali it is not condoned for a married woman to refuse to engage in sex with her husband, even if she knows he is HIV-infected. Many people remain uneducated as to the cause and transmission of AIDS and therefore fear and isolate or ostracize the HIV-infected person. USAID would benefit from the guidance and partnership of local experts and/or local NGOs on how to "market the rights issues" through the cultural sensitivities surrounding these complex beliefs and practices.

8. Instruments to Promote Civic Culture Centers

Promotion of civic culture is a long-term commitment, wherein civic culture centers are one area of effort. The USAID/Mali Strategic framework permits a ten-year realization period for the promotion of civic culture. Capacity building and the increasing use of local NGOs and PVOs should be considered a core aspect of the sustainability of civic culture and cost-effective implementation of such grass-roots efforts.

Many Malian PVOs and NGOs will require some technical support, ranging from technical implementation ideas, to guidance and training on record keeping that meets USAID standards. These kinds of supports could be brought in through a variety of means from specific task orders contracting products, to US PVO oversight, to nonproject assistance for connecting the grassroots to policy makers.

However, it is very important that USAID/Mali also bear in mind that income-generating capacities of their counterpart Malian NGOs/PVOs is also key to sustainability. Therefore, USAID might wish to consider specific NPA TA to provide such support.

Annex 2. Persons Consulted

USAID/MALI

Pamela White, Interim Director

Dennis Bilodeau, Info-Communication SO Team

Kojo Busia, DGSO Team

Anna Diallo, DGSO Team

Yacouba Konaté, DGSO Team

Jo Lesser, Education SO Team

Dennis McCarthy, AEG SO Team

Ursula Nadolney, Health SO Team

Sékou Sidibé, DGSO Team

DONORS

Etienne Léandre, Coopération Française

Namoury Traoré, Ambassade de Pays Bas

Iann Pasteur, Coopération Suisse

Paul Jatho, UNDP

AMERICAN PVOS AND CONSULTANTS

Maimouna Bado, World Education

Lynn Lederer, SAVE THE CHILDREN USA, Sahel Field Office Director

Leslie Long, WORLD EDUCATION, Associate Director

Mike Mailloux, CLUSA, Coordinator

Garth Van't Hul, CARE, Governance Technical advisor

Jean Michel Vigreux, CARE, Director

Karen Ramsey, The Mitchell Group, Inc., Management Coordinator

Sambala Sidibé, World Education

Julie Robison, Research Triangle Institute, Municipal Development Specialist

Wesley Weidemann, Wediemann Associates, Inc., President

GRM OFFICIALS: BAMAKO

Noel Diarra, Commissariat au Développement Institutionnel (CDI)

Maro Diabate, Direction des Collectivités Territoriales, Finances Locales

Pathé Maiga, Direction des Collectivités Territoriales

BOUGOUNI

Nicolas Sidibé, Save the Children, Coordinator

Moustapha Ali, INAGEF

Seba Diawara, Trainer, Civic Education Center

People and Name of People Interviewed at Civic Education Center, village chief, women's reps, etc//

KOLONDIÉBA

Oumar Kandé, Deputy Maire, Kolondiéba Commune

Moussa Doumbia, Secrétaire-General, Kolondiéba Commune

Théophile Coulibaly, 1er adjoint to Préfet , Kolondiéba Cercle

Selibé Dembelé, Préfet, Kolondiéba Cercle

Souleymane Koné, Station Manager, Radio Benso, (Rural Radio in Kolondiéba)

Broulaye Sidibé, Save the Children DG coordinator

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Annex 4. Scope of Work

1.1 BACKGROUND

The new Democratic Governance Strategic Objective (DG SO), “Shared Governance through Decentralization” is being designed to foster and strengthen effective partnerships between civil society and local government for attaining sustainable development. This is defined as the establishment of effective partnerships for accomplishing common goals and programs by all relevant actors -- local government (including state representatives), civil society and local entrepreneurs -- working together to undertake a wide range of functions under democratic communal governance.

Governance shared by local officials, elected leaders, and civil society is still at the embryonic stage. The mechanisms for citizen’s participation in local government planning and budgeting are not yet established, nor are transparent procurement practices being employed. Systematic efforts to improve the capacity of community organizations (COs) in representing their members and local citizenry is a direct result of USAID’s interventions largely through partnerships with U.S. PVOs. Advances in COs’ abilities to govern themselves democratically, to manage themselves efficiently, and to carry out civic actions are evident, but are not yet the norm. The decentralization movement in Mali, with local empowerment and responsibility delegated to newly formed communes, represents a great challenge and opportunity, that USAID is prepared to assist with.

The new DG SO will build on USAID/Mali's current strategy, which supports the development of civil society organizations at the commune level in becoming effective partners in local democratic governance and sustainable development. The implementation and proclamation of a national decentralization policy by the Government of Mali (GRM), as a catalyst for development, is an element in achievement of all the strategic objectives in USAID/Mali. The proposed DG SO will reinforce this framework through USAID’s contribution in building the capacity of civil society to participate fully in such development.

When a system of democratic local governance is firmly established, Mali should have greater government responsiveness and accountability on the one hand and opportunity for broad-based citizen participation in local decision making on the other. Indeed, the establishment of new communal government structures and partnerships with civil society will complete the local democratic governance equation. Thus, the strategic focus for the DG SO will be to foster effective partnerships, using democratic processes and mechanisms, between civil society and local government to attain sustainable development. Elements of the proposed program will be implemented nationwide, but co-governance initiatives at the community level will be targeted to specific geographic localities and will not include all communes in Mali.

1.2 TITLE

Technical Assistance to finalize the D/G S.O. result framework, indicators, targets and activities for the Strategic Objective.

1.3 OBJECTIVE

The contractor shall assist the Democratic Governance Strategic Objective Team with finalizing the Results Framework, indicators, targets and activities for the new strategic objective.



1.4 PERFORMANCE WORK STATEMENT

The consulting team should review the following documents thoroughly prior to developing the training program:

- ◆ Current strategy result framework;
- ◆ DGSO R4 2000, 2002, and 2003;
- ◆ USAID Mali CSP Parameters Paper;
- ◆ DGSO commune analytical study;
- ◆ DGSO concept paper;
- ◆ Civil society strategy assessment-Mali case;
- ◆ Reports on various analyses conducted by the Mission and DGSO team in developing the CSP;
- ◆ Mali decentralization laws and regulations.

These documents will be made available to the contractor by the DGSO team.

1.4.1 PERFORMANCE REQUIREMENTS

A. General requirements:

The contractor will provide technical assistance to the DGSO team in designing and finalizing the Results Framework for the new strategy, indicators, targets and activities. In addition, the contractor will provide an analysis of the potential for establishment of civic education centers that may be a component of the new DGSO.

B. Specific Requirements:

Performance Requirement 1: Key document review conducted and partners consulted.

Performance Standard.

Performance Requirement 2. Results Framework, indicators, targets and illustrative activities list developed and finalized.

Performance Standard:

- a) Results Framework, indicators, targets and activities will be collaboratively developed in conformance with agency guidelines and ground-truthed, by the contractor and the DGSO team;
- b) A workshop will be held by the contractor with stakeholders to include, but not be limited to, representatives of USPVOs, Malian NGOs, Associations of Malian Municipalities, representatives of the government, civil society organizations. The purpose will be to validate the Results Framework, indicators, targets and illustrative activities list; and

- a) The contractor shall review all the documents cited above and other relevant documents on Mali decentralization laws and implementation.
- b) The contractor shall consult with Government of Mali Ministry of Territorial Administration to get updated on progress of decentralization reform.
- c) The contractor shall consult with key donors who are implementing decentralization programs in Mali (UNDP, French Cooperation, the Dutch, European Union, the Swiss) and the lessons learned from their respective programs.
- d) Summary of these reviews and discussions will be prepared.

- c) Review the Results Framework, indicators, targets and activities to ensure that they are focussed, coherent, achievable and within the Missions manageable interest.

Performance Requirement 3: Analysis conducted and recommendations made for the potential of establishing civic education centers under the new strategy.

Performance Standard:

- a) Site visits will be conducted to learn lessons from experimental civic education centers established under the Save the Children, USA program in Kolondieba and Bougouni;
- b) Issues, challenges and benefits identified and analyzed of the possible inclusion of civic education centers under the new DG strategy, as related to improving good citizenry and civil society organizations participation in local democratic governance;
- c) Opportunities will be identified with other SOs teams such as the Information and Communication Special Objective Team (InfoComm) for using new technology at these centers to increase access to information (health, education, economic opportunity) at the rural community level; and
- d) Recommendations will be provided on the process necessary for establishment of viable civic education centers.

1.4.3 QUALITY ASSURANCE PLAN

Progress meetings between USAID's technical officer and the contractor will be held weekly to monitor performance. In addition, the DG team will review the draft reports for comments and suggestions.

1.5 ACCOUNTING AND APPROPRIATION DATA

Budget Fiscal Year:

Operating Unit:

Strategic Objective:

Team/Division:

Benefiting Geo Area:

Object Class:

Ceiling Price:

Total Amount Obligated:

1.6 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE/DELIVERY SCHEDULE (Contractor to propose)

It is expected that all results will be achieved and the final report submitted within Six (6) weeks of contract initiation, per the following delivery schedules:

- Performance requirement 1 (_____)
Date
- Performance requirement 2 (_____)
Date
- Performance requirement 3 (_____)
Date
- D/G comments/suggestions on draft report due 7 days following receipt of draft report
- Final report due 7 days following receipt by the contractor of D/G's comments/suggestions on the draft report.

1.7 REPORTS

The contractor shall submit (a) a report in English on the strategy development including a conceptual framework, a result framework, a description of indicators, targets and activities, (b) a report in English on the analysis for establishing civic education centers. Both reports shall be submitted in hard copies (five copies) and in electronic Word 97 version on a diskette to the DG SO Team.

1.8 TECHNICAL DIRECTIONS/RELATIONSHIP WITH USAID

Technical Directions during the performance of this task order shall be provided by the Technical Officer as stated in Block 5 of the cover page pursuant to Section F. 14 of the contract.

1.9 PERIOD OF PERFORMANCE

- a. Work shall commence on the date noted in Block 7 of the cover page. The estimated completion date is reflected in Block 8 of the cover page.
- b. Subject to the ceiling price of this task order and the prior written approval of the Technical Officer (see Block No. 5 on the Cover Page), the contractor may extend the estimated completion date, provided that the extension does not cause the elapsed time for completion of the work, including the furnishing of all deliverables, to extend beyond 60 calendar days from the original estimated completion date. Prior to the original estimated completion date, the contractor shall provide a copy of the Technical Officer's written approval for any extension of the term of this task order to the Contracting Officer; in addition, the contractor shall attach a copy of the Technical Officer's approval to the final voucher submitted for payment.
- c. It is the contractor's responsibility to ensure that the Technical Officer-approved adjustments to the original estimated completion date do not result in costs incurred that exceed the ceiling price of this task order. Under no circumstances shall such adjustments authorize the contractor to be paid any sum in excess of the task order.
- d. Adjustments that will cause the elapsed time for completion of the work to exceed the original estimated completion date by more than calendar days must be approved in advance by the Contracting Officer.

1.10 WORKDAYS ORDERED (to be filled in by Contractor)

- a. Labor: For all personnel who will perform directly under the task Order, labor information shall be provided in the following format:

Functional Labor Category/Level	Fixed	No. of Hourly Rate	Total Hours LOE	(BxC)
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Total

- b. The individuals identified above are designated as key personnel pursuant to Section F.16 of the contract.
- c. Subject to the ceiling price established in this delivery order and the prior written approval of the Technical Officer, the contractor may adjust the number of workdays actually employed in the performance of the work by each position specified in this order. The contractor shall attach a copy of the Technical Officer's approval to the final voucher submitted for payment.
- d. It is the contractor's responsibility to ensure that the Technical Officer-approved adjustments to the workdays ordered for each functional labor specialist do not result in costs incurred which exceed the ceiling price of this delivery order. Under no circumstances shall such adjustments authorize the contractor to be paid any sum in excess of the ceiling price.

1.11 CEILING PRICE (to be filled in by Contractor)

For Workdays Ordered \$

For Other Direct Costs \$

Ceiling Price \$

The contractor will not be paid any sum in excess of the ceiling price.

1.12 PAYMENT OFFICE

Office of Financial Management
USAID/Mali
Dept. of State
Washington, D.C. 20521-2050
BP. 34, Bamako, Mali
Tel: 223 22 39 71
Fax: 223 23 33 36

1.13. PLACE OF PERFORMANCE

The Duty Post for this task order is Mali.

1.14. LOGISTIC SUPPORT

The contractor shall provide all logistical support required for conducting the work as detailed in the statement of work including preparing all materials and documents, agendas, office supplies and for conducting the workshop, etc.

1.15. USAID AND OTHER LIAISON OFFICIALS:

Technical Directions during the performance of this Task Order shall be provided by the Technical Officer as stated in Block 5 of the cover page pursuant to Section G.1(b) of the contract.

1.16. LANGUAGE REQUIREMENTS

All of the expatriate personnel providing technical assistance under this contract must have French language competency at the R4/S4 level.

1.17. NUMBER OF COMMUTER TRIPS TO WASHINGTON, D.C. AUTHORIZED, IF ANY (Contractor to propose)

1.18. GOVERNMENT FURNISHED PROPERTY, IF ANY

N/A

1.19. WORKWEEK

The contractor is authorized up to a six-day workweek in the field with no premium pay.

1.20 . AUTHORIZED GEOGRAPHIC CODE

The authorized geographic code for procurement of goods and services under this order is 935.

1.21. SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS/RELEVANT INFORMATION (e.g., Source/Origin Waivers)

N/A

1.22. STATEMENT ON RESULTS

"The Contractor understands and agrees that achievement of the Results, Benchmarks, or Tasks contained herein is the essence of this Task Order, and that USAID will judge the Contractor's success or lack thereof on whether or not the Results are achieved. In the event that any one or more of the Results are not achieved or should the Contractor at any time realize that they are not achievable, the Contractor shall immediately advise USAID in writing and, in the next report required under the Task Order's reporting requirements, shall provide a complete explanation of the related circumstances."

1.23. ORGANIZATIONAL CONFLICTS OF INTEREST: PRECLUSION FROM IMPLEMENTATION CONTRACT—TASK ORDERS

This task order calls for the Contractor to furnish important services in support of the design of Financial Management Practices for Effective Communal Governance. In accordance with the principles of FAR Subpart 9.5 and USAID policy, THE CONTRACTOR SHALL BE INELIGIBLE TO FURNISH, AS A PRIME OR SUBCONTRACTOR OR OTHERWISE, THE IMPLEMENTATION SERVICES FOR THE ACTIVITY, EXCEPT FOR SUCH SERVICES THAT MAY BE FURNISHED UNDER A SEPARATE



TASK ORDER ISSUED UNDER THIS CONTRACT, unless the Head of the Contracting Activity, in consultation with USAID's Competition Advocate, authorizes a waiver (in accordance FAR 9.503 and AIDAR 709.503) determining that preclusion of the Contractor from the implementation contract would not be in the Government's interest.